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in his concurring opinion in Strachman v. Palmer,2" counseled that
"[fiederal courts should not be overeager to hold on to the determination of issues that might be more appropriately left to settlement in
state court litigation ....

26

In McSparron, the court expressed its awareness of the problems
that could result if the recent Newman v. Freeman27 precedent, a
factually similar case, but which granted pendent jurisdiction on
motion to join after suit had begun, were to be construed as allowing
pendent jurisdiction as a matter of right. It thus appears that
the McSparron court was cognizant of the need for this discretionary
power and properly refused the mother's pendent claim.
The expansion of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has been
justified on the grounds of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants. The beneficial aspects of this doctrine make
possible a complete remedy for the adjudication of the plaintiff's
rights while avoiding piecemeal litigation. The essence of a successful
application of this doctrine is a balancing process which should
encompass discretion by the court in the weighing of the various
problems involved. The federal courts should remain cognizant
of the adverse effects of an infringement upon state court integrity.
Since there is no general Congressional authorization for pendent
jurisdiction, it appears that in each particular case, provided the
requirements of the Hum doctrine are satisfied, the federal courts
have a wide discretion in deciding whether pendent jurisdiction is
proper and expedient.
Daniel L. Schofield

Malpractice--Sterilization Operation
Ps, a mother of nine and her husband, employed Ds, three physicians, to perform a sterilization operation upon the wife. The
operation was suggested by Ds to prevent deterioration of the wife's
physical condition which would result from the birth of another child.
Subsequently the wife became pregnant. Prior to the birth of the
25

177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949).

Id. at 433. See also Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine
of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLum. L. RExv. 1018
(1962); 46 ILL. L. Rrv. 646 (1951); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 51 IowA L. BEv. 151 (1965).
26

27 262 F.Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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child Ps sued Ds for breach of contract, malpractice, misrepresentation and fraud and deceit. The lower court sustained Ds' general
demurrers without leave to amend on the ground that Ps failed to
state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Held, reversed
and remanded with directions to rule on points presented by the
special demurrers. If Ps are successful in establishing the liability
of Ds they will be entitled to more than nominal damages even if
a normal child is born and the wife suffers no physical injury as a
result of the pregnancy. Custodiov. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
The court's decision in this case represents a departure from past
judicial policy in cases in which parents have claimed damages
for the normal birth of a normal child resulting from the failure of
a sterilization operation upon either the husband or wife. In
decisions dealing with this question the courts have previously
refused to find that there was any legally compensable injury, and
consequently no compensatory damages have been awarded. However, the principal case refuses to follow that policy by recognizing
that although the birth is a normal one and the child normal and
healthy, the parents may, nevertheless, be injured by such birth
and entitled to damages.
I.

INJURY

To entitle an allegedly injured party to recover damages in a tort
or contract action it must, of course, appear that the party suffered
some actual damage or injury. Thus assuming, as Custodio did,
that the other necessary elements of a cause of action can be
established, is there a legally compensable injury to the parent in
a case such as this? There is little authority on the point. Even in
cases in which damages have been denied, the denial has not always
been placed specifically on the ground that no damage or injury
was suffered.' Reasons for refusal to award damages have been
variously stated: the purpose (therapeutic) of the operation was
not to save expenses incident to childbirth; 2 to award damages in
such a case would be against public policy;3 the plaintiff-parents
suffered no damage from the normal birth of a normal child. 4 The
general rule of policy which the courts have recognized seems to have
1 Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).

(1934);

Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
3 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
4Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
2
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two variations. It may be stated that the normal birth of a normal
healthy child does not result in injury or damage,' or that although
there may have been injury or damage it is not legally compensable.6
Other cases indicate that when the normal birth of a normal child
follows the negligent failure to perform a sterilization operation that
the parents have a right to recover damages!
In Custodio and in another recent case, Bishop v. Byrne,8 there
is a recognition that the normal birth of a normal child can constitute
a legal injury for which damages can be recovered. In Bishop, the
court stated: "[A]ssuming that it can be established that it [the
operation] was negligently performed, it follows that if the condition
which it sought to avoid subsequently occurred and as a result
mental or physical suffering, or both, accompanied it, the victim
has been injured." 9 It seems indisputable that some injuries do
result from the birth of a child under circumstances like those in
Custodio and that damages should be awarded for such injuries.
II.

DAMAGES

If damage does result from a normal birth of a normal healthy
child the question then arises as to what the measure of those
damages will be. It is important to note that plaintiffs in Custodio
alleged causes of action for both breach of contract and malpractice,'"
and thus could recover damages under a contract theory or a tort
theory. It is well recognized that although a doctor is not a
warrantor of his treatment, he may make himself liable for damages
for breach of contract if he has contracted to achieve a particular
result and has failed to do so." And if the failure to perform the
contract as promised is negligent, then by the single negligent failure
to perform, he may also make himself liable for damages in a
tort action.' 2
In some instances such as these, the operation is performed for
therapeutic purposes only, i.e., to protect the health of the wife from
s Id.
6

Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. and C.2d 41 (1957).

7 Doerr v. Villate, 74 M11.
App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
8 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W.Va. 1967).

9 Id. at 463.

1o Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (1967).

11Steward v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Clouticr
v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627 (1964).

12 Steward v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Colvin v.
Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795 (1949).
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danger incident to childbirth; while in other cases the purpose is
wholly economic, i.e., to avoid the expense incident to the birth
and rearing of a child. This distinction may be of significance in
assessing damages. Applying both a contract theory and a tort
theory and keeping in mind the two possible purposes for which
a sterilization operation might be performed, it is interesting to
consider the elements of damage for which plaintiffs might reasonably
be expected to recover.
Both the husband and wife in Custodio sought to recover for
medical expenses and the cost of rearing and maintaining the child. 4
In addition the wife sought to recover for pain and suffering and the
husband for mental suffering.'" The court indicated that damages,
if proven, could be recovered for all of these elements. 6
A. Medical Expenses
Where the parties have contracted for a particular result, damages
are said to be limited to the payment made to the physician by the
patient and the patient's expenditures for nurses or medicines or
other damage flowing from the breach of contract.'" Clearly the
element of medical expenses falls within this rule whether the
purpose of the operation be therapeutic or economic.
In a negligence suit, plaintiff is entitled to recover damages only
for those injuries which proximately result from the defendant's
negligence.' 8 Medical expenses incident to the birth of a child
are a proximate result of the defendant's negligence in performing
a sterilization operation no matter what its purpose and should be
recovered in a malpractice action.
B.

Support

In regard to the element of damages for expense of rearing the
child, a valid distinction can be made between operations for a
therapeutic purpose and those for purely economic purposes, when
13

Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); West

v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash.
2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
'4

Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 467 (1967).

Is Id.

16id. at 476.
'7 Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795 (1949).

18Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228, 48 So.2d 231 (1950);
Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955); Edwards v. Hobson,
189 Va. 948, 54 S.E.2d 859 (1949).
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a contract theory is applied. When the purpose of the operation is
economic, the application of the rule that a party to a contract is
liable for all the damages which were within the contemplation of
the parties as a result of a breach at the time the contract was formed
would appear to be the proper measure of damages.' 9 Certainly a
party to a contract of this nature should be able to recover the very
expenses his contract was designed to prevent. But when the contract
is purely for therapeutic purposes, and its breach results in the
normal birth of a normal child, and the mother is not harmed, it
seems arguable that no damages for breach of contract should be
recoverable. In this instance the damage which the contract was
designed to prevent (harm to the wife's health) has not occurred,
and in such a case the parents may receive a net benefit from the
breach of contract in the enjoyment of rearing a child.
Also under a negligence theory the element of expenses of rearing
a child seems to be a proximate result of the negligent performance
of a sterilization operation when the purpose of the operation is
economic. However in the cases of expenses of rearing and
maintaining a child who is born as the result of negligently performed
therapeutic sterilization operation, there may well be some merit
to the opinion expressed by one court that the expenses are incident
to the bearing of a child and their avoidance is remote from the
avowed purpose of the operation. 2"
C.

Pain and Suffering

Pain and suffering are proper elements of damages in a malpractice
suit." There is no mathematical measure for pain and suffering;
rather it must be left to the determination of the jury.2 2 It might be
argued that damages for pain and suffering should be recoverable
only to the extent that the pain and suffering in a particular case
exceeds that which normally accompanies pregnancy and childbirth.
But since there would have been no pain and suffering had the
operation been successfully performed, it seems that damages should
be recoverable for all pain and suffering. Also, in the case of the
negligent performance of a therapeutic sterilization operation, the
award of damages could conceivably be greater than in the case
'"

Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).

20 Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620,
21 Olsen v. McAtee, 181 Or. 503, 182 P.2d 979 (1947);

622 (1934).
Hively v. Higgs,

120 Or. 588, 253 P. 363 (1927).
22Roedder v. Rowley, 28 C.2d 820, 172 P.2d 353 (1946); Botta v.
Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1957).
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of an operation for economic purposes, since the pain and suffering
in the former case might be greater due to the uncertainty concerning
the ultimate effect of the pregnancy on the health of the wife and
complications which may result. There are some recent indications
that damages for pain and suffering are recoverable in a situation
similar to that in Custodio.23 However such damages have been
denied in another case.24 In Bishop v. Byrne25 the court, taking
judicial notice of what was common knowledge, recognized that a
period of pregnancy followed by the birth of a child, under circumstances like those in Custodio, would cause the mother some pain
and suffering and held that the amount of damages to be awarded
for this was a question for jury determination. There is no indication
in the Bishop case that the wife could recover damages only for the
pain and suffering in excess of that which usually accompanies a
normal pregnancy and birth.
D.

Mental Suffering

Although Custodio indicated that the husband should be able to
recover for mental suffering, this does not seem possible under
established rules of law. Normally, a party cannot recover in tort
for mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury,26 and here
the husband has suffered no physical injury. Certainly if this
damage were alleged by the wife it would seem to be compensable.27
One case recognized this as an element of damage for both husband
and wife under similar circumstances,28 but others have refused to
grant damages therefor.29
However, "where the contract is personal in nature and the
contractual duty or obligation is so coupled with matters of mental
concern or solicitude ... that a breach of that duty will necessarily
or reasonably result in mental anguish . . .compensatory damages

therefor may be awarded."3

Under this principle the husband

23 Doerr v. Villate, 74 IIl. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); West v.
Undenvood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945).
24 Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
25
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 464 (S.D. W.Va. 1967).
26 Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D. W.Va. 1967); Monteleone
v. Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 348, 36 S.E.2d 475, 479 (1945).
27 Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955); West v.
Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945).
28Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967): West v.
Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945).
29 Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934);
Ball
v. Mudge,
64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
0
3 Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 14, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949).
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would seem to be entitled to damages for his mental suffering. This
certainly was a contract of a personal nature coupled with matters
of personal concern and solicitude. Breach of the contract, especially
when the contract is for therapeutic purposes, would reasonably give
rise to mental anguish.
The Custodio court indicated that although the wife might survive
without injury, there would still be some loss, since she must spread
her society, comfort, care, and protection over a larger group, and
that if the change in family status could be proved in terms of
monetary loss it should be compensable. No other case similar to
Custodio has indicated that damages of this nature might be recoverable. In fact, one recent case which recognized that the normal birth
of a normal child could constitute a legally compensable injury
failed to recognize any loss caused by change in family status as an
element of recovery. 2 Certainly as a practical matter this intangible
factor would be so difficult to prove, and of such a speculative nature,
that it should not be compensable.
A recent case, Bishop v. Byrne,33 which is in point with Custodio

is most significant. The court there recognized specifically that if a
therapeutic sterilization operation were negligently performed, and
as a result the condition that it was designed to prevent occurred,
e.g., pregnancy, accompanied by mental or physical suffering by
plaintiff, the victim would be injured. " This appears to be the first
case to recognize specifically that the normal birth of a normal child
could constitute damage. Although the court held that plaintiff-wife
could not recover under a breach of warranty theory because there
was no proof of a contract between the defendant-physician and
plaintiff, the court indicated plaintiff could recover damages in tort
for physical pain and suffering and mental worry and anxiety if the
jury determined she had suffered such damage.3 s The court held
that whether the wife experienced mental or physical suffering or
both from the pregnancy and Caesarian section presented disputed
issues of fact which precluded a grant of summary judgment.3
The primary significance of the Custodio case and the Bishop
case is the holding that a legally compensable injury may result from
, Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967).
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W.Va. 1967).

32
33
3

4
35
36

Id.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 464.
1d.
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the normal birth of a normal child. Both courts also recognized that
plaintiffs could recover damages for these injuries. This conclusion
appears to be a reasonable one when considered in relation to well
established rules of law regarding damages. Under these rules there
appear to be no barriers to the recovery of damages by plaintiffs
in cases similar to Custodio.
The problems presented by these cases are novel ones and are not
easily resolved, but the courts appear to have arrived at a very
satisfactory solution. Certainly it is not possible to predict to what
extent, if at all, other courts will follow the holdings of the Custodio
and Bishop cases. Nevertheless the decisions in these cases appear
to lay a solid foundation on which other courts may base their
decisions when confronted with similar problems of this nature in
the future.
JamesAlan Harris

Procedure-Intrastate Application of Forum Non Conveniens
P was injured in an automobile accident and brought suit against
D, a foreign insurer, in the jurisdiction where D was domiciled. P
could elect to proceed against D in alternate jurisdictions, either the
situs of the accident or the domicile of D. Upon D's motion, a change
of venue to the situs of the accident was granted inasmuch as a
crowded court docket would be relieved and the convenience of
the litigants and witnesses would best be served by reducing travel
time. P appeals, charging the transfer as error. Held, reversed. The
doctrine of forum non conveniens is foreign to Louisiana jurisprudence and contrary to the general venue statute which provides a
change of venue may be had only where a fair and impartial trial
cannot be obtained in the forum in which the action has been
initially brought.1 Trahan v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 200 So. 2d 118
(La. 1967).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens deals with the discretionary
power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction when
it appears that the cause before it could be more conveniently and
appropriately tried elsewhere.' One of the functions of the doctrine
' LA. STAT. ANN.-C.C.P., art. 122 (West 1961).
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,
29 CoLUm. L. REv. 1 (1929).
2
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